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Abstract
We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Tax-
ation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized
at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation there-
fore differs across levels of government. Complementarities on the spending side
decouple the equilibrium composition of spending and taxation and create a role for
inter governmental grants. The model provides an explanation for the centralization
of revenue, introduction of grants, and expansion of federal income taxation in the
U.S. around the time of the New Deal. Quantitatively, it accounts for between 30%
and 100% of the federal revenue share’s doubling in the 1930s, and for the long-term
increase in federal grants.
JEL Classification: D72, E62, H41, H77
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Federalism, Politico-economic equilibrium, Markov equi-
librium, Public goods, Grants, Political Economy
1 Introduction
Whether control over fiscal policy should rest with national, regional or local governments
depends on how effective these agents make use of their authority. When information
frictions render it difficult to cater to heterogeneous needs, fiscal policy is best chosen
de-centrally. When it is key to internalize spillover effects, in contrast, centralized policy
choices are advantageous. A broad body of fiscal federalism literature has studied the nor-
mative and positive implications of this fundamental trade-off. The focus of that literature
has generally been on static sources of the cost-benefit differences across governments.
∗For useful comments and discussions, we thank Asger Lau Andersen, Maximilian von Ehrlich, David
Dreyer Lassen and seminar participants at CEMFI, IIBEO workshop, SED, Universidad Carlos III, and
University of Copenhagen.
†University of Copenhagen. Oster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark. E-mail:
mge@alum.mit.edu
‡Study Center Gerzensee and University of Bern. P.O. Box 21, CH-3115 Gerzensee, Switzerland.
E-mail: dirk.niepelt@szgerzensee.ch.
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In this paper, we propose a complementary—dynamic—source that arises from general
equilibrium effects of taxation. We show that this dynamic source of cost differences across
governments is present under a wide set of assumptions, and we argue that it can help
explain the dramatic fiscal transformation in the United States during the 1930s when
federal tax collections increased strongly and federal grants started their long-term rise.
The model features overlapping generations that work, save, consume, and vote as well
as a central, or federal, government and many regional governments that impose labor
income taxes to finance the provision of public services.1 In politico-economic equilibrium,
households make optimal savings choices conditional on current and expected future poli-
cies; and they vote for their preferred political candidates, taking the policy functions
of other political decision makers as well as the competitive equilibrium conditions into
account.
Taxation slows down capital accumulation and thus has general equilibrium effects: It
drives up interest rates and lowers future wages. Voters and policy makers at the federal
level—rationally—internalize these general equilibrium effects, at least to the extent that
they affect them.2 In contrast, voters and policy makers at the regional level—rationally—
do not perceive general equilibrium effects of their decisions since regions are small relative
to the nation and markets are not segmented. As a consequence, the net cost of a federal
tax hike as perceived by a voter participating in national elections differs from the net
cost of a regional tax hike as perceived in regional elections.
In the baseline specification, federal and regional spending are perfect substitutes and
all static sources of cost-benefit differences across governments are absent: Government
spending does not generate externalities; preferences for public services are uniform across
the population; and regional tax bases are immobile, undermining any motive for tax
competition. We show that, nevertheless, the incentives to raise taxes at the federal
level differ from those at the regional level. Depending on the sign of the dynamic general
equilibrium effects, federal taxation enjoys stronger or weaker support in politico-economic
equilibrium than regional taxation, and the equilibrium composition of tax collections
across governments is determinate.
This result is robust along many dimensions. We introduce labor mobility across re-
gions and find that it does not fundamentally alter our findings. We allow for elastic
labor supply, tax distortions, and additional policy instruments and show that the re-
sults are robust since the perceived cost differences due to general equilibrium effects are
orthogonal to the effects of tax distortions. We also find that our results are robust to
introducing policy instruments for intergenerational redistribution, such as public debt or
social security, or longer-lived households.
We also consider the effects of capital income taxation. In contrast to labor income
taxes which depress workers’ savings, capital income taxes do not affect future capital
1We refer to a state with a multi-tier political organization as a “federal” state, and to a government
that makes decisions at the central level as a “federal” government. We refer to governments making
decisions at the local level as “regional” governments.
2The welfare consequences for yet unborn cohorts who are not represented in the political process are
not internalized.
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accumulation because they are chosen ex post and reduce the income of the old.3 From
the perspective of federal and regional voters, the net cost of taxation thus is the same and
the asymmetry in the political support for federal versus regional taxation disappears. A
shift from capital to labor income taxation therefore can trigger a major change in the
composition of tax collections, favoring federal or regional income taxation.
We argue that this mechanism offers an explanation for the dramatic fiscal transfor-
mation that the United States underwent during the 1930s, see figures 1 and 2.4 On the
eve of the Great Depression, local governments collected the majority of tax revenues and
property taxes accounted for nearly half of all revenues. The federal government’s main
source of revenue were tariffs, and on a smaller scale, property taxes.5 In the 1930s this
arrangement changed completely.6 As indicated by the solid line in figure 1 the revenue
share of the federal government nearly doubled and inter governmental grants (indicated
by dots and discussed below) emerged as a central source of revenue for state and local
governments. An even more dramatic transformation occurred with respect to the federal
tax base, see figure 2. The income tax share of federal revenues more than doubled within
a few years and continued to grow quickly for another decade, and the share of tax units
who paid federal income tax similarly exploded.
Our model explains this transformation as the equilibrium response to the ratification
of the Sixteenth Constitutional Amendment which introduced the possibility for the fed-
eral government to tax income.7 Starting from a situation with exclusive competence for
income taxation at the level of the states and strong reliance on property taxes (which
generate limited general equilibrium effects), the ratification opened the door for the fed-
eral government to tax labor income and to exploit the general equilibrium effects we
emphasize.8 Stronger demand for government outlays, specifically for New Deal policies
and spending related to World War II, subsequently strengthened the incentives to employ
the newly available tax instrument, and the fiscal transformation took place.
Importantly, our model does not aim at explaining the increase in total government
3When cohorts live longer than for two periods then capital income taxes do affect capital accumulation
but by less than labor income taxes. The perceived difference in tax collection costs across governments
then is smaller than with labor income taxes.
4See Wallis (2000) for a discussion of this and two earlier transformations of the American fiscal
architecture.
5Federal tariffs were set against the background of intense interstate conflict between more indus-
trialized states that demanded protection from imports, and states that relied more heavily on such
imports. Proponents of tariffs emphasized infant industry arguments and stressed the need for national
self sufficiency. See Taussig (1910). Note that the Constitution rules out interstate tariffs.
6See Wallis and Oates (1998) for a description of New Deal programs and a discussion of federal
deficits that accompanied the transformation.
7The Sixteenth Amendment states: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.”
8Income taxes predominantly affect savers. While they are collected from both workers (who save)
and retirees (who do not), the fraction of individuals paying taxes sharply falls with age, see for example
Greenstone and Looney (2012). Applying Piketty and Saez’s (2003) methodology to classify respondents
we find that in the 2015 March Current Population Survey 87% of tax units aged 65 or below paid taxes,
roughly twice the share of those aged 65 years or older.
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Figure 1: Fiscal transformation in the United States: Federal revenues and grants
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Federal relative to total government revenues (solid), and federal grants relative
to state and local revenues (dots). Sources: Wallis (2000) for years 1902, 1913,
1922, 1927; NIPA tables for subsequent years.
Figure 2: Fiscal transformation in the United States: Federal income taxation
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of tax returns relative to number of tax units (solid), and federal in-
come tax (including OASDI) relative to total revenue of the federal government
(dots). Sources: Piketty and Saez (2003) Table A0, and Office of Management
and Budget, Fiscal Year 2016, Historical Tables, Table 2.2.
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revenues. Instead, it aims at explaining the shift in the composition of government fi-
nancing, the centralization of revenue collection, as well as the decoupling of revenue
collection and government spending that is reflected in the rise of inter-governmental
grants (discussed below).
Our model abstracts from within-cohort distributive conflicts as well as administrative
and legal hurdles that had to be overcome before the federal government could start
levying a comprehensive income tax, and which were brushed aside by the need to increase
expenditure for New Deal policies and World War II spending.9 10 While the model thus
is silent about the time lag between the Amendment’s ratification (1913) and the actual
transformation in the 1930s it does account for the magnitude of the transformation. A
calibrated baseline model with two groups of regions that differ in terms of their preference
for public services predicts a rise in the federal government’s tax share in line with the
data once a tax without general equilibrium effects is replaced by a tax with such effects.
To study the second feature of the fiscal transformation illustrated in figure 1, and to
further discipline the quantitative analysis, we introduce a role for federal grants. This
requires that the composition of both taxes and spending across governments is determi-
nate. We therefore relax the assumption that regional and federal spending are perfect
substitutes and instead assume complementarities between the two spending components.
The grant instrument has value when it is beneficial to channel revenue from the federal
government to regions, either because tax revenue at the federal level is “cheap” or because
positive cross-regional externalities from public service provision imply inefficiently low
regional spending in the absence of grants.
The extended framework is as analytically tractable as the baseline model. In line with
empirical evidence, it predicts grants to crowd out local taxation.11 More importantly,
it is able to explain the trend increase of grants as the result of time varying regional
disparities which we associate (supported by empirical evidence) with preference hetero-
geneity regarding the size of government between urban and rural regions. The model’s
explanatory power for the federal tax share remains substantial; the extended framework
explains roughly 30% of the observed increase between 1930 and 1950. In both the basic
and the extended framework, we find that an alternative explanation for the fiscal trans-
formation that relies on static spending externalities as they are discussed in the fiscal
federalism literature cannot satisfactorily quantitatively explain the data.
9The Treasury underwent a major reorganization; the number of employees at the Bureau of Internal
Revenue increased fourfold; and the Supreme Court had to uphold the constitutionality of tax legislation
enacted based on the Amendment (in 1916) and made a series of decisions relating to the proper definition
of income and the fairness of its taxation (after the First World War), see Mehrotra (2013). All of this
happened against the backdrop of political conflict as to who should pay income tax and how progressive
the system should be, reflected in sharp swings in the highest marginal tax rate and the share of the
population that was tax liable.
10Vélez (2014) argues that across a sample of OECD countries, progressive income taxation was insti-
tuted as a response to war efforts.
11For example, Knight (2002) finds statistically and economically significant crowding out for the
Federal Highway Aid Program in the U.S. He addresses identification problems (an omitted variable bias
due to the positive correlation between grant levels and unobserved preferences for public spending) by
using the political power of state congressional delegations as instruments.
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Related Literature We build on the classic analysis of fiscal federalism that stresses
trade-offs between forces favoring centralization and decentralization. Oates (1972) finds
that absent spillovers and cost-savings from centralized tax collection or public good
provision, heterogeneous preferences render decentralization preferable. Without infor-
mation frictions, a centralized system may in principle support differentiated provision
(Oates, 1999). But various political economy frictions favor uniform centralized policy
choices.12 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) analyze the effect of international integration on
the costs and benefits of centralization and thus, the number of countries.
Similar arguments are discussed in the political science literature (e.g., Kincaid, 2011)
which tends to favor federalist governance structures for diverse countries. Treisman
(2007) questions many rationales for and against political decentralization. He argues
that administrative efficiency requires administrative, not political decentralization and
he criticizes the view that local governments better manage local information.13 Our
argument is related in so far as it stresses the decoupling of tax and spending decisions.
Horizontal and vertical tax competition in federal structures gives rise to important
static externalities. Gordon (1983) discusses revenue (and other) externalities due to
uncoordinated regional taxation of mobile factors, and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) an-
alyze the interplay between horizontal and vertical tax externalities. A federal government
concerned with welfare at the national level may correct some of these externalities by
imposing federal taxes or extending federal grants. Our paper also emphasizes tax exter-
nalities but of a different type, namely dynamic externalities due to general equilibrium
effects, and it builds a positive theory of fiscal federalism and federal grants.14
Uniform federal grants combined with non-uniform federal taxes (or vice versa) redis-
tribute between regions and may constitute a form of inter-regional risk sharing (see, for
example, Persson and Tabellini, 1996). The fact that such risk-sharing is very common
does not provide a rationale for federal grants, however, since risk sharing in the joint
interest of regions can be implemented without federal intervention. In our model, fiscal
policy does not redistribute, and grants are used to achieve an allocation of resources that
regions would not choose by themselves.
Wallis (2000) documents that the U.S. passed through distinct regimes of government
finance and suggests that the costs of raising revenue differ across governments. Our model
provides an explanation for such cost differences that stresses general equilibrium effects.15
12For example, legislative bargaining among regional representatives at the federal level may imply
reduced sensitivity of policy to regional needs (Lockwood, 2002); differentiated central service provision
can give rise to costly bargaining and delay and may thus be avoided (Harstad, 2007); credibility problems
in signalling local tastes to the central government may generate inefficient federal policy choices (Kessler,
2014); and centralization to increase accountability may have to be accompanied by policy uniformity
because otherwise, the central government would implement policies favoring regions that monitor more
extensively (Boffa, Piolatto and Ponzetto, 2016).
13According to Treisman (2007), decentralization is important for policy stability and centralization is
important for fiscal coordination.
14Hatfield and Padró i Miquel (2012) study an economy where some public goods are funded and
provided regionally and others federally. They show that the federal government imposes capital income
taxes while regions resort to lump sum taxes, due to tax competition. In our setting, the grant instrument
decouples funding from public good provision.
15In other contexts, Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990), Soares (2005), and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt
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This explanation complements alternative, static theories that rely on permanently lower
information processing costs for the federal government;16 permanently higher external-
ities from public infrastructure investment; or interstate mobility and tax competition
which have been criticized.17 In addition to offering a novel source of differences in the
cost of taxation our model can quantitatively account—at least in parts—for the dramatic
transformation of the U.S. fiscal system during the 1930s and afterwards.
On the methodological side, our paper relates to the literature on dynamic politico-
economic equilibrium (Krusell, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull, 1997). While most work in this
literature studies equilibria with a single political decision maker Song, Storesletten and
Zilibotti (2012) analyze politico-economic equilibrium in a setting with a continuum of
governments that take factor prices as given. We solve a dynamic game with a continuum
of regional governments and a central government that internalizes general equilibrium
effects.
Outline The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe
the model, and in section 3 we define equilibrium. Section 4 contains the analysis of the
baseline model and several extensions. In section 5, we contrast the model’s quantitative
implications with empirical evidence on the fiscal transformation in the U.S. during the
1930s and subsequent fiscal trends. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Demographics and Institutions
We consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations: workers and retirees.
Workers supply labor, pay taxes, consume and save. In the subsequent period, they
retire, consume the return on their savings, and die. The ratio of workers to retirees in
period t equals νt. This demographic parameter follows a deterministic process.
The economy is composed of a continuum of regions of measure one over the unit
interval. Each region is populated by a continuum of homogeneous agents. The population
structure including the preferences of agents are the same across regions (we relax this
assumption later). Regions are indexed by i.
Policy decisions are taken by governments at the federal and the regional level. Federal
and regional governments act in the interest of voters participating in nationwide and
(2008) have emphasized the role of general equilibrium effects in politico-economic equilibrium.
16Wallis (2000) suggests that the introduction of Social Security payroll taxes could have lowered federal
tax collection costs.
17Rhode and Strumpf (2003) document that households’ migration decisions mostly reflect personal
factors rather than Tiebout (1956) sorting and they find that the secular decrease in mobility costs in the
United States was not accompanied by stronger policy or preference heterogeneity across communities.
Rhode and Strumpf (2003) conclude that “any theoretical or empirical model that adopts a pure Tiebout
framework . . . is misspecified” (p. 160). Similarly, Baicker, Clemens and Singhal (2012) find that “patterns
in mobility, seem to have little power to explain observed changes in the landscape of fiscal federalism”
(p. 1080).
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regional elections, respectively. None of the governments can commit, and in each period
they take decisions simultaneously.18
2.2 Production of Final Good
A continuum of competitive firms transforms capital and labor into output. Capital is
owned by retirees—it corresponds to the savings of workers in the preceding period—and
fully depreciates after a period. The economy-wide capital stock per worker, kt, therefore
corresponds to the economy-wide per-capita savings of workers in the previous period,
st−1, normalized by νt. Labor is supplied inelastically (we relax this assumption later).
The gross interest rate Rt and the wage wt are determined competitively.
We assume that the production function displays constant returns to scale such that
factor prices in period t only depend on kt,
Rt = R(kt), wt = w(kt). (1)
Moreover, we assume that the elasticities of the factor prices with respect to the capital-
labor ratio are independent of the latter,
εRk ≡ d ln(Rt)/d ln(kt) ⊥ kt,
εwk ≡ d ln(wt)/d ln(kt) ⊥ kt.
Examples of production functions that satisfy these assumptions include the Cobb-Douglas
production function with capital share α where factor prices equal Rt = αkα−1t and
wt = (1 − α)kαt , the Ak production function, or a small open economy with exogenous
factor prices.
The independence assumption can be disposed of at the cost of loosing the ability to
derive closed-form solutions.
2.3 Production and Financing of Public Services
The quantity or quality of publicly provided services (or public services, for short) in
a region i, git, depends on public spending at the regional level and nationwide. Let
eit denote spending at the regional level and et the—uniform—spending by the federal
government.19 In the baseline model, we assume that federal and regional spending are
perfect substitutes in the production of public services and we abstract from externalities
across regions (we relax both assumptions below). Accordingly,
git = e
i
t + et. (2)
18In the data, this is not strictly true as state and federal elections of the executive and legislative
branches are not perfectly synchronized. Our choice of timing assumption is motivated by our interest in
the long run determinants of fiscal federalism, and the fact that one period in the model corresponds to
several decades.
19Thus, we allow for both levels of government to tax and spend. For rationalizations of policy unifor-
mity at the federal level, see the literature review in the introduction.
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Spending by the federal government is financed by a labor income tax at rate τt and
spending by region i is financed by a tax at rate τ it . (Below, we introduce federal grants
as an additional source of regional revenue.) Since all governments balance their budget
in each period this implies
et = wtτt, e
i
t = wtτ
i
t . (3)
Tax rates are non-negative.
2.4 Preferences and Household Choices
Workers and retirees in region i and period t value private consumption, ci1,t and ci2,t re-
spectively, as well as public services. Workers discount the future at factor β ∈ (0, 1). For
analytical tractability, we assume that period utility functions are logarithmic. Welfare
of a worker who chooses savings sit is given by
ln(ci1,t) + γt ln(g
i
t) + β
(
ln(ci2,t+1) + γt+1 ln(g
i
t+1)
)
s.t. ci1,t = wt(1− τt − τ it )− sit, ci2,t+1 = sitRt+1.
Parameter γt measures the preference for public services.
Taking prices and taxes as given the worker optimally chooses
sit =
β
1 + β
wt(1− τt − τ it ). (4)
Since equilibrium consumption and saving of a worker are proportional to the after tax
wage, lifetime utility is proportional to the log after tax wage, the log gross interest rate,
and the logarithms of current and future public services. We summarize this information
in the indirect utility functions of workers and retirees, respectively, which equal (dropping
constants)
U i,wt = (1 + β)(ln(wt) + ln(1− τt − τ it )) + β ln(Rt+1) + γt ln(git) + βγt+1 ln(git+1), (5)
U i,rt = ln(s
i
t−1) + ln(Rt) + γt ln(g
i
t) (6)
subject to (2), (3). Here, sit−1 denotes the inherited stock of savings by retirees.
2.5 Elections
Elections take place at the beginning of each period, simultaneously in all regions and
nationwide. Workers and retirees may vote on candidates whose electoral platforms specify
values for the policy instruments as well as other characteristics like “ideology” that are
orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimensions of interest. These other characteristics
are permanent and cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition.
Moreover, their valuation differs across voters (even if voters agree about the preferred
policy platform) and is subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates
have chosen their platforms. This “probabilistic-voting” setup renders the probability
of winning a voter’s support a continuous function of the competing policy platforms. It
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implies that equilibrium policy platforms smoothly respond to changes in the demographic
structure and other fundamentals.
In the Nash equilibrium of the game with two competing candidates in a constituency
choosing platforms to maximize their expected vote shares, both candidates propose the
same policy platform.20 This platform maximizes a convex combination of the objective
functions of all groups of voters, where the weights reflect the groups’ sizes and sensitivity
of voting behavior to policy changes. Those groups that care the most about policy
platforms rather than other candidate characteristics are the most likely to shift their
support from one candidate to the other in response to small changes in the proposed
platforms. In equilibrium, such groups of “swing voters” thus gain in political influence
and tilt policy in their own favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in the
policy platforms, electoral competition implements the utilitarian optimum with respect to
voters. We assume that across regions, voters are equally responsive to proposed changes
in policy platforms. However, we allow for age related variation in responsiveness, reflected
in a per capita political influence weight of unity for young voters and a per capita weight
of ω ≥ 0 for retired voters.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
The state is given by zt, which includes the exogenous demographic parameter as well as
the cross section of savings levels across regions which we denote by ~st−1. (Throughout the
paper, we use this notation for cross sections.) Conditional on zt, the production function
as well as competition among firms determine factor prices, wt and Rt. A financing policy
(or policy for short) of all regions and the federal government, (~τt, τt), then determines
public services, ~gt, capital accumulation, ~st, and thus zt+1. Conditional on zt, a policy
sequence {~τs, τs}s≥t then fully determines an allocation and price system.
We focus on symmetric equilibria where all regions behave identically, except possibly
a set of regions of measure zero. We denote the “typical” regional tax by τ jt , and “typical”
public services by gjt .
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium conditional on z0 and a policy sequence {τ jt , τt}t≥0
is given by an allocation and price system such that
i. capital evolves according to kt = st−1/νt, and factor prices are determined according
to (1) for all t;
ii. the government budget constraints (2) and (3) are satisfied for all t; and
iii. households optimize: (4) is satisfied for all i, t.
20See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of probabilistic
voting.
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3.2 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In politico-economic equilibrium political decision makers optimally choose the values of
the policy instruments under their control, taking all implications of their actions into
account and forming rational expectations about future policy choices. We assume that
these choices are Markov that is, they are functions of the fundamental state variables.
We conjecture and later verify that policy choices are independent of the endogenous state
variables, ~st−1, such that future policy choices are unaffected by current policy choices.
This conjecture is motivated by two observations. First, the indirect utility functions are
additively separable in prices and policy (reflecting our assumption about preferences and
the production of public services); and second, the elasticities of factor prices with respect
to the capital-labor ratio are orthogonal to the latter (reflecting our assumption about
the aggregate production function).
Political decision makers at the regional and federal level perceive the economic en-
vironment differently. On the regional level they take policy choices by the federal gov-
ernment and in other regions, as well as factor prices and externalities, as given. On the
federal level they take regional policy choices as given and account for the endogeneity of
factor prices.
Formally, under the conjecture a regional decision maker at date t takes (wt, wt+1, Rt, Rt+1)
as well as sit−1 and (τ
j
t , τt, τ
i
t+1, τ
j
t+1, τt+1) as given and her objective is ωU
i,r
t /νt + U
i,w
t .
Effectively, she maximizes
V it ≡
(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γt ln(g
i
t) + (1 + β) ln(1− τt − τ it ) s.t. (2), (3). (7)
In contrast, the federal decision maker at date t takes (wt, Rt) as well as st−1 and
(τ jt , τ
j
t+1, τt+1) as given and she is concerned with ωU
j,r
t /νt + U
j,w
t . Effectively, she maxi-
mizes
Vt ≡
(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γt ln(g
j
t ) + (1 + β) ln(1− τt − τ
j
t ) + β ln(Rt+1) + βγt+1 ln(g
j
t+1) (8)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), kt+1 = st/νt+1.
We can now define politico-economic equilibrium (under the conjecture).21
Definition 2. A politico-economic equilibrium conditional on z0 is given by a policy
sequence {τ jt , τt}t≥0 and an allocation and price system such that
i. τ it ≥ 0 maximizes V it and τ it = τ
j
t for all i, t;
ii. τt ≥ 0 maximizes Vt for all t; and
iii. the allocation and price system constitute a competitive equilibrium conditional on
z0 and {τ jt , τt}t≥0.
21In general, politico-economic equilibrium requires that political decision makers anticipate future
policy choices to be determined according to policy functions (mappings from the state into policy)
and that optimal policy choices are consistent with policy functions evaluated at the state. Under the
conjecture this consistency requirement is trivially satisfied.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Main Result
Absent heterogeneity in regional preferences or static externalities from spending or tax-
ation across regions, none of the traditional static fiscal federalism motives for decentral-
ization or centralization is present. Nevertheless, the equilibrium degree of centralization
of tax collections generally is determinate. To see this, consider the derivative of the
regional objective function V it with respect to the regional tax rate, τ it (which equals τ
j
t
in equilibrium), and the derivative of the federal objective function Vt with respect to the
federal tax rate, τt. Since tax rates must be non-negative the derivatives of V it in (7) and
of Vt in (8) must be weakly negative in equilibrium,(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γt
τ jt + τt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ jt
≤ 0, (9)(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γt
τ jt + τt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ jt
+ Ft ≤ 0. (10)
In addition, the corresponding complementary slackness conditions must be satisfied.
The terms in the first inequality represent the marginal benefit and cost, respectively,
of a higher regional tax rate as perceived by voters at the regional level. The marginal
benefit derives from higher public services which both old and young voters appreciate,
and the marginal cost reflects reduced wealth and thus, consumption of workers.
In the second inequality, the first two terms represent the marginal benefit of higher
public services and the direct marginal cost of lower consumption as perceived by voters
in nationwide elections. The marginal benefit and the direct marginal cost are the same
as those perceived on the regional level because of the uniformity of preferences and the
absence of static spending externalities.
The third term in the second inequality,
Ft ≡ −
β
1− τt − τ jt
(εRk + εwkγt+1) ,
represents the indirect net benefit of higher taxes due to general equilibrium factor price
effects that young voters at nationwide elections internalize. This net benefit materializes
in the subsequent period (thus the discounting) and works through the tax induced reduc-
tion in savings in all regions (note that d ln(st)/dτt = −1/(1− τt− τ jt ), see equation (4)).
The benefit arises in the form of higher interest rates (reflected in εRk, which is negative),
and the cost in the form of a lower tax base to fund public services in the future (reflected
in εwk, which is positive) weighted by the preference for public services in the subsequent
period, γt+1.
A comparison of the two inequalities implies that the equilibrium degree of centraliza-
tion of tax collections, and the amount of taxes that are collected both are determinate
unless Ft = 0. Since at least one of the tax rates τ jt and τt must be strictly positive in
equilibrium (otherwise gjt = 0), at least one of the two first-order conditions must hold
12
with equality. But Ft 6= 0 implies that at most one first-order condition can hold with
equality and thus, that either τt or τ jt equals zero. If Ft > 0 then the first-order condition
with respect to τt holds with equality, that is τt is interior and τ jt = 0. If Ft < 0, in
contrast, the first-order condition with respect to τ jt holds with equality, that is τ
j
t is
interior and τt = 0.
Intuitively, determinacy results because voters at nationwide elections perceive differ-
ent net benefits of taxation than voters in regional elections. For example, when lower
savings drive up interest rates sufficiently strongly to render Ft > 0, then the federal
government levies taxes because voters at nationwide elections internalize that taxation
improves their inter temporal terms of trade. In contrast, when lower savings depress
next period’s wages sufficiently strongly and the preference for public services in the sub-
sequent period is sufficiently high to render Ft < 0, then regional governments levy taxes
because only voters at nationwide elections internalize the cost of taxation that results
from lowering next period’s tax base. A binding commitment for regions not to raise
taxes would improve voters’ welfare in that case.
We have characterized equilibrium policy. Note that we have verified our earlier conjec-
ture that the policy functions are orthogonal to the endogenous state variables. Although
the capital stock does not enter the first-order (and complementary slackness) conditions
the trade-offs underlying the conditions are dynamic as they relate contemporaneous tax
revenue and spending with future factor prices and revenue. The gain in tractability
does not arise from suppressing this dynamic interaction, as in static models, but from
specifying functional forms that render the factor price elasticities and the derivatives of
the indirect utility functions orthogonal to the capital stock. As shown elsewhere, in a
related setting, different functional form assumptions (which render equilibrium policy a
function of the capital stock) generate very similar numerical predictions for equilibrium
outcomes.22 We summarize these findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that εRk + εwkγt+1 6= 0 such that Ft 6= 0. Then, in equilibrium,
only one level of government levies taxes. In particular, for εRk + εwkγt+1 < 0 (such that
Ft > 0) only the federal government levies taxes and for εRk + εwkγt+1 > 0 (such that
Ft < 0) only the regional governments levy taxes.
The “bang-bang” property of the equilibrium policy is a direct consequence of the
fact that only Ft drives a wedge between the regional and federal first-order conditions,
and that the sign of this wedge does not vary with taxes. In the quantitative analysis,
we introduce preference heterogeneity. When general equilibrium effects are positive but
small, federal taxes then only crowd out regional taxation in low valuation regions; this
smoothes the response of average regional taxes to an increase in Ft.
Before turning to the quantitative analysis, however, we discuss the robustness of the
finding in proposition 1.
22In Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005) we numerically solve for the equilibrium in a model with
intergenerational transfers. We find that quantitatively, the numerical solution for equilibrium policy in
the model version with CRRA preferences is very similar to the analytical solution in the version with
logarithmic preferences.
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4.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
In deriving proposition 1 we have assumed that labor is supplied inelastically. This as-
sumption is not important for the results. To see this, suppose that households value
leisure in addition to consumption and government services such that household prefer-
ences are given by
ln(ci1,t) + v(l
i
t) + γt ln(g
i
t) + β
(
ln(ci2,t+1) + γt+1 ln(g
i
t+1)
)
,
where lit and v(·) denote leisure and a smooth utility function, respectively.23 The budget
constraint of a worker now reads
ci1,t = wt(1− lit)(1− τt − τ it )− sit.
It is easy to check that in this more general model labor supply does not respond to
contemporaneous taxes, and proposition 1 therefore continues to hold without changes.
Maybe more interestingly, one may wonder whether in an environment with endoge-
nous labor supply voters would employ additional distorting policy instruments to manip-
ulate prices for their benefit. In appendix A, we analyze this in more detail. We consider
an environment where voters at the federal and regional level may impose additional
taxes whose proceeds are fully refunded to workers. These taxes therefore only serve to
distort labor supply (which they do because the proceeds are refunded). At the regional
level, voters do not benefit from creating such distortions. But at the federal level, where
general equilibrium effects are internalized, the tax might be perceived to be valuable.
As we show in appendix A, introduction of these new instruments does not change the
first-order condition for τt, but adds a distortion term, −X lst ≤ 0 say, to the first-order
condition for τ jt . The results of proposition 1 thus continue to hold subject to replacing
Ft by Ft + X lst : Taxation at the federal level constitutes an equilibrium outcome as long
as Ft + X lst > 0. Intuitively, under the equilibrium choice of the new tax instrument at
the federal level, the net benefit in general equilibrium from distorting labor supply equals
zero. The choice of τt thus reflects the same considerations as in the model without elastic
labor supply.
4.3 Labor Mobility
As another extension, consider a model where young households supply labor inelastically,
but are mobile across regions. After voting, but before taking up work and being taxed,
they may move at a utility cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, regional voters then still do
not perceive general equilibrium price effects of their tax choices. But they do account for
the fact that a marginal tax increase fosters emigration and reduces the tax base, driving
up taxes for the remaining population in the region. Denoting by X lmt the welfare cost
of such emigration, results similar to those of proposition 1 follow, with taxation at the
federal level an equilibrium outcome as long as Ft + X lmt > 0.
23We assume that v(·) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, concave and satisfies
liml↓0 v
′(l) =∞.
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4.4 Government Debt and Social Security
In our setup, voters at the federal level only internalize the general equilibrium effects
that affect themselves; they disregard the income losses of future workers that go hand in
hand with their own gains due to higher interest rates. One may therefore suspect that
the availability of instruments for intergenerational redistribution—government debt or
pay-as-you-go financed social security—could undermine the main result.
To see that this is not the case, suppose that the federal government also levies a social
security tax at rate ηt whose proceeds are distributed among retirees.24 The first-order
conditions that characterize public services provision, conditions (9) and (10), then are
unchanged except that the tax wedge now includes the new tax rate. This might affect
the magnitude of the general equilibrium term, Ft, but not its sign.25 The main message
of proposition 1 therefore is robust: The level of government that collects taxes to fund
public services is determined by the sign of Ft.
4.5 Longer-Lived Households
In the baseline model, voters at the federal level fully account for the general equilibrium
effect on interest rates while they internalize the general equilibrium effect on wages only
partly, to the extent that it affects the public service provision in the subsequent period.
This asymmetry is a consequence of the assumption that agents live for just two periods;
if households lived, and supplied labor for more than two periods then some of the voters
would also internalize the effect of contemporaneous taxes on their own subsequent wage
income.
This feature is irrelevant for the results summarized in proposition 1, though, since
these results hold independently of the weight attached to the effect on future wages. In
the baseline model, the weight reflects the preference for public services. But nothing
substantive would change if the weight also reflected future labor income. Note also
that some asymmetry of the type described above would remain in place even if agents
lived for many periods. This is because independently of agents’ life span, current voters
always fully internalize the effects of policy on future capital income while they only partly
internalize the effects on future labor income which also benefits some workers who are
yet unborn when policy is chosen.
24Our setup satisfies the conditions for politico-economic equivalence (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2015,
condition 4). This implies that absent commitment, the politico-economic equilibrium allocation in an
environment with public debt and another one with pay-as-you-go financed social security are identical.
We leave an extension with public debt issued by both levels of government for further work.
25The additional first-order condition determining the level of social security tax rate, ηt, is given by
ω
νt
1
α
1−α + ηt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ jt − ηt
+ Ft = 0.
With intergenerational redistribution, the taxes levied to fund public services thus fall. Similarly, social
security taxes are lower than in a model without public services.
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4.6 Capital Income Taxes
Finally, consider the implications of changing the tax base from labor to capital income.
At the time when capital income taxes are decided upon and implemented, they only
affect consumption of the old, but not savings of the young. As a consequence, the federal
government perceives no equilibrium factor price effects, Ft = 0. Moreover, the weight
that political candidates attach to the cost of taxation changes from (1 +β) to ω/νt since
the old rather than the young bear the tax burden. Otherwise, the first-order conditions
for taxes remain unchanged.26
Total taxes thus are determinate in equilibrium but the degree of centralization of
tax collections is not. Intuitively, unlike in the baseline model with labor income taxes,
voters at the federal and regional level in an economy with capital income taxes perceive
exactly the same trade-off when weighing the pros and cons of a tax hike. Note that the
indeterminacy of the equilibrium composition of capital income taxes is closely related
to the bang-bang property of equilibrium labor income taxes in the baseline model (see
proposition 1). For example, with region-specific preferences over public services, regions
with a high preference for public services may levy labor income taxes in the baseline model
even if Ft > 0; and the same regions may levy capital income taxes in the modified setup
although Ft = 0 and although the federal government levies taxes as well. We discuss
the case with region-specific preferences (and static externalities and complementarities)
below.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We analyze the model’s predictive power in two steps. In the next subsection, we focus on
the relative size of the federal government and how it grew during the 1930s. As discussed
in the introduction, we relate the observed growth to the new policy options afforded by
the ratification of the 16th Constitutional Amendment and the increased demand for fiscal
resources against the background of the New Deal and World War II. Subsequently, we
include grants in the analysis and extend the forecast period. We do this for two reasons.
First, because the steady increase in the importance of federal grants constitutes a key
element of the fiscal transformation that began in the 1930s. And second, because motives
to provide federal grants and to tax at the federal level naturally relate to each other such
that introducing the former imposes additional discipline in our quantitative analysis.
5.1 The Rise of Federal Taxation
Between 1900 and 1930 the federal government’s share in tax collections averaged roughly
38.3%; by 1950 this share had risen to 72.6%, with most of the increase occurring during
the 1930s (see figure 1 in the introduction). To assess whether dynamic general equi-
librium effects of taxation can explain this increase, we simulate a simple extension of
26Although tax bases of labor and capital income taxes are different, implying different levels of spending
for a given tax rate, voters face a similar trade-off between the marginal cost and benefit of taxation since
preferences are logarithmic.
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the baseline model that allows for preference heterogeneity across regions. The need to
introduce heterogeneity (or some other modification) arises because the baseline model
generates “bang-bang” solutions (see proposition 1) while in the data, the inter govern-
mental composition of tax collections is interior.
We assume that there are two types of regions, with high and low preference for pub-
lic services, γ1t and γ2t < γ1t respectively. The share of high and low preference regions
is denoted θ1t and θ2t . In symmetric equilibrium all regions within the same group be-
have identically, except possibly a set of regions of measure zero. The endogenous state
therefore contains the savings of retirees in the typical regions, ~st−1 = (s1t−1, s2t−1), and
policy at date t is given by (~τt, τt). In the equilibrium we focus on, high preference regions
levy taxes and provide public services even if the federal government does the same; low
preference regions, in contrast, do not levy taxes and fully rely on federal provision.
The equilibrium conditions in the extended baseline model are given by(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γ1t
τ 1t + τt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ 1t
= 0,(
ω
νt
+ 1
)(
θ1t γ
1
t
τ 1t + τt
+
θ2t γ
2
t
τt
)
− (1 + β)
(
θ1t
1− τt − τ 1t
+
θ2t
1− τt
)
+ Ft = 0, (11)
with Ft ≡ −β/(1 − τt − τ̄t) (εRk + εwkγ̄t+1), where a “bar” denotes the average across
regions. The first condition which reflects the tax choice in high preference regions is
identical to condition (9). Condition (11), which reflects the choice of federal tax rate,
generalizes condition (10) by summing and weighing region-specific marginal effects.
Our strategy to assess the importance of dynamic general equilibrium effects for the
tax structure is as follows: We calibrate the model with general equilibrium effects from
taxation (Ft 6= 0) to exactly match the size of governments in 1950. (We use 1950 rather
than 1940 as the base year because by that time government finances likely reflected a more
regular, post-recovery and post-war mode.) We then shut down the general equilibrium
effects from taxation (Ft = 0) and solve for the equilibrium that we associate with the
situation before the fiscal transformation when the federal government mostly relied on
tariffs and property taxes. We do this assuming either the demographic structure in the
year 1930 or 1950. In either case, we find that shutting down the general equilibrium
channel implies a large drop in the federal tax share.
For the calibration, we assume that one period in the model corresponds to 30 years
in the data. We posit a Cobb-Douglas production function for the final good and use
the following parameter values: Based on findings in Piketty and Saez (2003) we let the
capital share in the production function be 0.2815. We set νt to the 30-year gross U.S.
population growth rate in 1950 and use Census Bureau data. From Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008) we take ω = 0.9176.
We associate regions that optimally levy taxes with “urban” regions and those that
do not with “rural” regions, and we proxy the share of urban regions, θ1t , by the average
urbanization rate as reported by the Census Bureau. The motivation to distinguish regions
by urban vs. rural character is twofold. On the one hand, the distinction seems relevant
for observed patterns of political support.27 On the other hand, the distinction also
27For example, Frank (2004) argues that low-income Americans living in rural areas vote strongly
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Table 1: Support for government spending cuts (in %)
1985 1990 1996 2006
Total 82.0 78.2 83.4 63.3
Urban 80.7 77.5 83.1 62.7
Rural 87.3 82.1 86.1 67.4
The table shows the percentage of respondents answering “strongly in favor of”
or “in favor of” government spending cuts. Data from General Social Survey.
Counties without towns of 10,000 or more inhabitants are classified as rural.
There are between 540 and 1293 urban observations in the four samples and
between 126 and 190 rural observations.
seems to be borne out by survey evidence. Data on attitudes towards public spending
collected by the General Social Survey in the years 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006 indicates
that respondents in rural areas favored government spending cuts more strongly than
respondents in urban areas, see table 1.28
To calibrate the preference for public services as well as β, we use the extended baseline
model’s first-order conditions for τ1950 and τ 11950 (which feature γ
j
1950 and γ
j
1980) and assume
that between 1950 and 1980, preferences for public services increase at the same rate as
the total size of government (federal, state, and local spending relative to GDP).29 In
addition, we use a moment condition for the Euler equation in steady state (see Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt, 2008).30 Table 2 lists the calibrated parameters and figure 3 illustrates
the demographic trends that we feed into the model of this and the subsequent subsection.
The β value corresponds to an annual discount factor of approximately 0.9769. The low
preference for public services in rural regions reflects our assumption that taxes equal zero
in those regions.
Republican even though the Republican party’s economic platform cuts against their economic interests.
We interpret this behavior as reflecting a lower preference for government spending in rural areas. Other
observers have argued that voters care more about moral than economic issues. See Ansolabehere, Rodden
and Snyder Jr. (2006) for a discussion of the “culture war” interpretation of these voting patterns.
28The annual survey is conducted by The National Data Program for the Social Sciences. Respondents
in the years 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006 were asked about their attitudes towards government spending
cuts.
29Data comes from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. In the model there is no public debt; revenues and expenditure thus are equivalent measures
of the size of government. To account for the absence of debt in the model we use the average of
current revenues and current expenditures as our measure of the size of government. For state and local
governments we subtract federal grants.
30We impose the 30-year gross interest rate R = 2.443. See Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) for
details.
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Table 2: Calibration of extended baseline model
β γ11950 γ
2
1950 γ
j
1980/γ
j
1950
0.4954 0.5013 0.1086 1.3471
Figure 3: Demographics and urbanization
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Population growth rate (solid) and urbanization (dots). Data from U.S. Census
Bureau. Projections for population growth as reported by Census Bureau (middle
series). Projections for urbanization interpolated based on United Nations (2014)
forecast for 2050.
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Based on this calibration we then let Ft = 0 and solve for the counterfactual politico-
economic equilibrium. We find that subject to the demographic structure in the year
1950, the relative share of the federal government drops from 72.6% (the actual value) to
40.1%. If we instead impose the demographic and regional structure in the year 1930 then
the relative share of the federal government drops to 41.3% (compared with 38.3% in the
data).31 That is, independently of how exactly we define the counterfactual, switching off
the general equilibrium channel of taxation explains almost all of the observed variation
in the tax share of the federal government over the 1930s.
An alternative, more traditional explanation might motivate the rise in the federal
government’s revenue share with reference to a stipulated increase in static externalities
from regional spending.32 To assess the quantitative plausibility of this alternative mech-
anism we introduce static externalities in the extended baseline model and check by how
much these static externalities would have had to increase to replicate the data.
Specifically, we assume that publicly provided services in region i are a function of
(regional and federal) spending in other regions, in addition to the spending in the region
itself,
git = (e
i
t + et) · (ēt + et)λ,
where λ measures the strength of the cross-regional externalities. It is straightforward
to verify that this modification leaves the equilibrium conditions unchanged except that
a new term Et enters into the optimality condition for federal taxes which captures the
benefit from higher federal taxes and thus, the benefit from federal spending, that operates
through cross-regional externalities,33
Et ≡
(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
λγ̄t
τt + τ̄t
.
Assuming the parameter values displayed in table 2 and letting Ft = 0, we find that
the strength of static externalities, λ, would have had to increase strongly, from zero to
more than 0.21, in order to have equivalent explanatory power as the general equilibrium
effects, i.e. to generate an increase in the federal government’s revenue share from 40.1%
in 1930 to 72.6% in 1950. We consider this increase to be implausibly high and conclude
that dynamic tax externalities in combination with the 16th Constitutional Amendment
offer a more plausible explanation for the U.S. fiscal transformation.
31Intuitively, the higher share of rural regions in 1930 implies that decision makers at the federal level
attach a stronger weight to those (rural) regions which benefit more strongly from federal taxation.
32Maybe the most plausible candidate in that respect would be public infrastructure investment to
support major technological innovations. But many of these innovations (in particular, electric light and
the internal combustion engine) already occurred at the end of the nineteenth century (Gordon, 2012).
And by the time of the Great Depression, most of the infrastructure investments based on them were
already undertaken, at least in urban areas. The shifts in the fiscal landscape thus should have been
observed earlier. Even if spending externalities had increased around the 1930s, federal spending should
have spiked rather than permanently increased since the higher externalities would have triggered a
federal public investment boom followed by more moderate maintenance spending. This is not what we
see in the data.
33Static externalities also affect the dynamic general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation (which
we shut off for this counterfactual simulation). We now have Ft ≡ −β/(1−τt−τ̄t) (εRk + εwk(1 + λ)γ̄t+1).
20
5.2 The Rise of Federal Grants
During the 1930s, federal grants started to gain importance as a source of funding for
states. Since then, the share of federal grants in state and local revenues has continued
to grow (see figure 1 in the introduction) and as a share of GDP, federal grants surpassed
0.5% in the 1950s and approached 2.8% in 2014. We now ask whether dynamic general
equilibrium effects also can contribute towards explaining this feature of the data.
To study the determination of grants we assume that regional and federal spending
are complements. Both the federal and the regional governments therefore must spend
resources for public services to be provided, and efficiency calls for the two levels of
government to spend resources in specific proportions. Federal grants serve the purpose
to decouple the composition of government spending across levels of government from the
composition of government revenue collection.
This decoupling is useful either if the net benefit of taxation, Ft, renders it “cheaper”
for the federal government to tax, or if it is advantageous to subsidize regional government
spending due to benefits from cross-regional externalities that are reflected in Et. We find
that the decoupling motive is sufficiently strong to explain most of the observed increase
in grants while the model still explains about 30% of the increase in the relative size of
the federal government during the 1930s.
5.2.1 Model with Spending Complementarities and Grants
As in the extended baseline model, the two groups of regions (which we index by j) are
differentiated by their preference for public services, γjt , and services in region i are a
function of regional and federal spending as well as spending in other regions.34 Letting
~et ≡ (e1t , e2t ) collect spending in the two typical regions, publicly provided services in
region i equal
git = a(e
i
t, et) · A(~et, et)λ.
Unlike in the extended baseline model where the spending components are perfect
substitutes we now consider the case of complements,
a(eit, et) = (e
i
t)
δ(et)
1−δ and A(~et, et) =
(
a(e1t , et)
)θ1t · (a(e2t , et))θ2t ,
where δ ∈ (0, 1). In the working paper we discuss micro foundations for this specification
(Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2017).35 We also provide detailed derivations for the general
case with many types of regions and discussions of the equilibrium conditions.
The federal government pays a positive, uniform grant, xt, to regional governments.36
34We allow for static externalities (λ 6= 0) in order to check the robustness of our findings but we set
λ = 0 in the baseline calibration.
35We discuss constitutional restrictions that prescribe which services must be provided (but not neces-
sarily financed) by regional or federal governments. The division could reflect externalities, spillovers, or
the strength of tax-benefit linkages for local voters, as highlighted by Tiebout (1956). See also Hatfield
and Padró i Miquel (2012).
36In the working paper, we also analyze matching grants (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2017). We
conclude that the model predictions are qualitatively unaffected by the type of grant.
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We allow for proportional deadweight losses of grants at rate 1 − σ ≥ 0.37 Accordingly,
condition (3) generalizes to
et = wt(τt − xt), eit = wt(τ it + σxt), e
j
t = wt(τ
j
t + σxt), j = 1, 2, (12)
and public services in region i equal
git = w
1+λ
t (τ
i
t + σxt)
δ(τt − xt)(1−δ)(1+λ)
2∏
j=1
(τ jt + σxt)
δλθjt .
The definition of equilibrium is modified in the obvious way and the political first-order
conditions with respect to τ jt and τt, respectively, now read(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γjt δ
τ jt + σxt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ jt
≤ 0, j = 1, 2, (13)
2∑
j=1
θjt
{(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γjt (1− δ)
τt − xt
− 1 + β
1− τt − τ jt
}
+ Et + Ft ≤ 0. (14)
Condition (13) differs from condition (9) in the baseline model because the marginal
benefit of taxation only depends on regional spending, reflecting the assumption of com-
plementarities rather than substitutes (as well as logarithmic preferences). Condition
(14) differs from condition (10) for the same reason. Moreover, it reflects both preference
heterogeneity, as in the extended baseline model, and cross-regional externalities.38
In addition to (13), (14), and the complementary slackness conditions a first-order
condition for grants holds in equilibrium:
σδ
2∑
j=1
θjt (γ
j
t + λγ̄t)
τ jt + σxt
− (1− δ)(1 + λ)γ̄t
τt − xt
≤ 0. (15)
The first term reflects the benefit from higher regional spending and the second term
represents the cost due to lower federal spending. Note that the degree of preference
heterogeneity—not the average preference for public services—affects the choice of grants.39
In appendix B we prove that in this model with grants, the federal government always
levies taxes while regional tax rates need not be positive unless grants equal zero. If
a parametric condition is met (which is more likely when deadweight losses are positive,
that is σ is small), all regions levy taxes and grants generically equal zero. If the condition
is violated (which is more likely when static or dynamic externalities are positive, that is
λ > 0 or Ft > 0), then grants are strictly positive and fully crowd out taxes in the region
with a low preference for public services. A mean preserving spread of the preference for
public services also renders positive grants more likely.
37In addition to capturing resource costs of inter governmental transfers, the “deadweight losses” might
serve as stand in for other frictions or specification errors, for instance related to the fact that the elasticity
of substitution between federal and regional spending could differ from unity.
38Because of the static externalities, Ft ≡ −β/(1 − τt − τ̄t) (εRk + εwk(1 + λ)γ̄t+1). The spending
complementarities affect the static cross-regional externalities; the latter now are given by Et ≡ λγ̄t(ω/νt+
1)(1− δ)/(τt − xt).
39This follows from dividing (15) by γ̄t.
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5.2.2 Model Predictions
In the baseline calibration, we assume no static externalities (λ = 0) and 7.5% deadweight
losses (σ = 0.9250). To calibrate the preference for public services as well as β and δ,
we use the political first-order conditions evaluated in 1950 and 2000. Specifically, we
match the size of the federal government and of total government (federal, state, and
local spending relative to GDP) as well as the GDP-share of grants in the year 2000,
and the size of total government in the year 1950. The calibration does not impose any
restrictions on the level of grants or the federal government’s revenue share prior to the
year 2000.
In principle, time variation in deadweight losses (σ); static externalities (λ); the im-
portance of federal vs. regional spending (δ); or preferences (γjt and θ
j
t ) could explain
the observed rise of federal grants (see proposition 2 in appendix B). Since there is little
tangible evidence for variation of the former three factors we focus on changing regional
preference disparities which we continue to associate with the shares of rural and ur-
ban regions. (Recall that preference heterogeneity—not the average preference for public
services—affects the choice of grants. Changes in the average preference for public services
therefore cannot explain a trend increase in grants.)
Our assumption that time variation in urbanization fostered the rise of grants also is
supported by indirect evidence that blends the model with data on state level spending.
Recall that the model predicts regions with a weaker preference for public services to
choose a higher ratio of grants relative to regional tax revenue. If urbanization is positively
correlated with the valuation of public services, as we argue, it should be negatively
correlated with that ratio. This prediction is borne out in state level data over the period
1969 to 2008: A panel regression of the ratio of federal grants and direct general revenue
of state and local governments on urbanization (and controls including state income per
capita) yields the expected negative sign, see table 3.40
Table 4 displays the calibrated parameters. The β value corresponds to an annual
discount factor of approximately 0.9838. The calibration for δ suggests an almost equal
importance of federal and regional spending in the provision of public services. To meet
the moment condition that rural areas do not levy taxes the calibration assigns a very
low value to the preference for public services in these regions, at approximately 3% of
the value in urban areas.41 Accordingly, the model also predicts a counterfactually high
ratio (7.0) of government spending in urban relative to rural areas, but introducing an
exogenous component for regional tax collections resolves this problem.42 Finally, to
40We use 2008 data to minimize measurement problems as a consequence of the Great Recession, and
we use data for the year 1969 rather than 1970 since the table in Dales (1971) appears to contain a typo
in the entry for Colorado. We exclude the District of Columbia as its urbanization rate is 100% in both
periods.
41This feature is robust to assuming matching grants, see Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2017).
42In state level data from the Census Bureau, the ratio of government spending in urban relative to
rural areas extends up to roughly 2.5. If we assume that regions exogenously collect a tax of 5% to
fund spending unrelated to the provision of public services, then the predicted ratio of spending in urban
relative to rural areas equals 2.5. This modification does not change the prediction of a trend increase in
grants; in the modified model, grants peak at 5.3% of GDP at the end of the simulation horizon.
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Table 3: Urbanization and grants
Federal grants relative to state and local revenue
Urbanization −0.3091
(0.1834)
Income per capita 0.2948
(0.2470)
State FE YES
Time FE YES
R2 72.57
Observations 100
The table displays panel OLS regression results over the period 1969–2008
with federal grants relative to state and local revenue as the dependent vari-
able. The explanatory variables are state-level urbanization and state income
per capita relative to the national average. Sources: Federal grants rela-
tive to state and local direct general revenue for 1969 are taken from Dales
(1970); grants for 2008 from the Census Bureau’s Consolidated Federal Funds
Report for Fiscal Year 2008, Table 4 (www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/cffr-
08.pdf); and state and local government finances for 2008 from the Cen-
sus Bureau (www.census.gov/govs/local/historical_data_2008.html). Relative
state income per capita is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(www.bea.gov/itable). Population and urbanization data comes from the Census
Bureau (www.census.gov). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Calibration of model with grants
β δ γ12000 γ
2
2000 γ
j
t+1/γ
j
t
0.6133 0.4830 0.8032 0.0223 1.1779
replicate the increasing size of governments between 1950 and 2000, the model requires
the preference for public services to grow at about 0.55% per year or 17.8% over thirty
years. This increase is qualitatively consistent with Wagner’s law and with the evolution
over time of attitudes towards spending cuts, as reported in table 1.43
By construction, the calibrated model perfectly matches the level of total government
in 1950 and 2000 as well as the federal share in tax collections in 2000. In contrast, the
predicted evolution of the federal share prior to 2000 is not constrained by the calibration.
For the post World War II period, the predicted share is nearly flat, compared to a slight
decline in the data.44 For the fiscal transformation phase (1930–1950), which is associated
with slowing population growth, rising urbanization, and the switch from Ft = 0 to Ft > 0,
the model predicts the share of the federal government to increase from 54.4% to 63.6%.
That is, the model explains nearly 30% of the actual increase.45
As for federal grants, the model captures the long-term increase but not the short-run
fluctuations (notably during the 1970s and the Great Recession), see figure 4. This reflects
the fact that in the data, grants also are used for redistributive and risk sharing purposes
which our model does not speak to. Importantly, the increase in grants since the 1930s
reflects rising urbanization and thus, preference heterogeneity, not the stronger average
preference for public services that the calibration imposes. This is particularly evident
when we simulate the model subject to constant rural and urban shares (at their year
2000 values); the model then predicts a slightly negative trend for grants, see figure 4. In
contrast to the important role played by urbanization, the changing demographics only
are of minor importance. If we fix the population growth rate at its year 2000 value,
the model predictions barely change.46 Out of sample, the model predicts that grants
43An alternative explanation for the rising size of government could rely on public services being a
luxury good, and higher incomes. Our assumption of logarithmic preferences rules out income effects on
tax rates.
44Baicker et al. (2012) offer a potential explanation for the post World War II increase in the share of
state governments.
45The difference in explanatory power across models is due to the fact that in the model with spending
complementarities the direct marginal benefit of federal taxes depends only on decisions made by the
federal government, while in the basic extended model this also depends on decisions made at the regional
level (see conditions (14) and (11)). Thus, when regional governments in high valuation regions respond
to a federal tax cut by raising taxes, in the basic extended model this dampens the effect that a tax
change has on the direct marginal benefit of federal taxes. As a result the federal government in the basic
extended model has to reduce taxes by more in order to account for a given shortfall in Ft.
46This reflects the fact that population growth does not directly enter the equilibrium condition for
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Figure 4: Federal grants, share of GDP
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060
year
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Data from NIPA (solid), model predictions (circles), model predictions with con-
stant urbanization (dots).
continue to increase in the future up to approximately 4.9% of GDP in the year 2060.
The model predictions are robust to changes in all parameters except λ and σ. When
static externalities are negative, λ = −3% say, or deadweight losses higher, σ = 90% say,
then the predicted grants peak at between 2.8 and 2.9% of GDP between 2040 and 2050
before reverting back to lower values. When spending externalities are positive, λ = 2%
say, or deadweight losses lower, σ = 94% say, then grants are predicted to increase to
between 9.3 and 10% of GDP in 2060. Intuitively, with lower deadweight losses or higher
static externalities, the federal government has a stronger incentive to provide grants (see
proposition 2).
While the value for λ has a major effect on the model predictions an alternative
specification that only allows for traditional, static externalities cannot plausibly explain
the variation in the data as well as the model with dynamic tax externalities. When
we re-calibrate the model under the assumption that the federal government does not
perceive the dynamic general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation (or that they
are not present) the results appear unreasonable, as in the previous subsection.47 We
interpret this as further evidence that our proposed explanation for the centralization of
revenue and the use of inter governmental grants is more plausible than an alternative
grants, equation (15), but only indirectly through its effect on taxation.
47Very large static externalities are required to match the moments described earlier: Subject to the
δ value reported in table 2, the calibrated λ value equals 0.3029 and the calibrated value for γ22000 is
negative. When we instead eliminate the moment condition for grants in the year 2000 and impose for
γ22000 the value reported in table 2 then the calibrated λ = 0.1246 and the predicted value for grants in
the year 2000 exceeds the value in the data by 33%.
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explanation that mainly focuses on spending externalities.
6 Concluding Remarks
What determines the degree of centralization of tax collections in a federal union? We pro-
pose a novel explanation that stresses differences in the perceived cost of taxation across
levels of government due to dynamic general equilibrium effects. The dynamic external-
ities we emphasize complement static externalities that have traditionally been analyzed
in the fiscal federalism literature, including spending externalities and externalities from
horizontal or vertical tax competition.
When augmented with complementarities of government spending our model also offers
an explanation for inter governmental grants. Grants have value because they allow to
channel revenue from the federal government where tax revenue is “cheap” to regions, or
because regions underspend as they do not internalize positive cross-regional externalities.
We find that dynamic general equilibrium effects can help explain the U.S. fiscal trans-
formation during the 1930s towards more centralized revenue collection, more widespread
use of grants, and increased reliance on income taxation. In our framework these changes
result in response to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which opened the
door for labor income taxation at the federal level, and higher demand for government
expenditure, specifically New Deal policies and World War II spending.
Our simple framework abstracts from cross-regional insurance, redistribution, and
many other features that are present in federalist states. Given this simplicity, its quan-
titative performance is reassuring. The baseline model fully accounts for the observed
increase in the relative size of the federal government during the 1930s, and a plausibly
calibrated extended model with spending complementarities accounts both for the trend
increase in federal grants since 1930 and for roughly 30% of the compositional change
during the 1930s.
Two extensions of the model appear to be of particular interest. First, the setup
could be extended to admit productivity differences across regions, generating a role for
cross-regional insurance and redistribution. Such an extension could be useful to study
the determinants of redistributive federal grants and the consequences of cross-regional
inequality, for instance in the post-World-War II U.S. or in the context of European
integration.
Second, the option to issue government debt for tax smoothing or tax burden shifting
purposes could be introduced both at the federal and the regional level. Governments
would hold conflicting views about the costs and benefits of public debt since regional
policymakers would not internalize the general equilibrium effects of deficits on prices.
As a consequence, the federal government might opt to employ grants (and deficits)
to influence both regional taxes and deficits. This extension could address questions
regarding debt and deficit policies in federal states.
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A Elastic Labor Supply
We introduce additional taxes on labor income, levied at rates ηt ≥ 0 and ηit ≥ 0 by the
federal and regional governments respectively, whose proceeds are reimbursed to workers.48
The program of a worker in region i is given by
max ln(c1,t) + v(lt) + γt ln(g
i
t) + β
(
ln(c2,t+1) + γt+1 ln(g
i
t+1)
)
s.t. c1,t = wt(1− lt)(1− τt − τ it − ηt − ηit) + T it − st, c2,t+1 = stRt+1,
where T it denotes the lump sum transfer to workers. In equilibrium, τ it = τ
j
t and ηit = η
j
t .
Moreover, since preferences for consumption and leisure do not vary across regions, labor
supply is constant across regions and T jt = (ηt + η
j
t )wt(1− lt). Workers’ optimal savings
and labor supply choices therefore imply
(1− τt − τ jt − ηt − η
j
t )(1 + β)
(1− τt − τ jt )(1− lt)
= v′(lt).
Thus, as long as ηt + ηjt > 0, taxation distorts labor supply.
In addition to the terms present in the baseline model, the objective functions of
regional and federal voters now also account for the effect of leisure on utility. Moreover,
the objective function of voters at the federal level also accounts for the general equilibrium
implications of endogenous labor supply for contemporaneous and future interest rates
and wages (the latter mediated through changes in capital accumulation). The objective
functions of regional and federal voters, V it and Vt respectively, are
V it = V it + v(lt) + (1 + β) ln(1− lt),
Vt = Vt + g(lt) ≡ Vt + v(lt) + ln(1− lt)
[
(1− α)
(
1 + αβ +
ω
νt
+
(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γt + αβγt+1
)]
,
where V it and Vt are defined in (7) and (8).
Because ηjt is distorting and regional governments do not perceive general equilibrium
effects, in equilibrium ηjt = 0.49
At the federal level, the first-order condition with respect to ηt is given by
dg(lt)
dlt
∂lt
∂ηt
≤ 0.
If the equilibrium choice of ηt is interior, then ∂lt/∂ηt > 0; this implies that dg(lt)/dlt = 0.
Alternatively, if the equilibrium ηt is in a corner such that ηt + ηjt = 0, then labor supply
is unaffected by ηt (as well as by τt and τ jt ).
48For a related analysis in another context, see Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008).
49The derivative of the regional objective function with respect to ηjt yields −
1+β
1−lt + v
′(lt) which is
negative if ηt + η
j
t > 0.
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Turning to the equilibrium choice of taxes that fund public services, we have
∂V it
∂τ it
− ∂V
i
t
∂τ it
=
(
v′(lt)−
1 + β
1− lt
)
∂lt
∂τ it
≡ −X lst ≤ 0 ∀i,
∂Vt
∂τt
− ∂Vt
∂τt
= 0.
The equality in the second line holds because, as shown above, either dg(lt)/dlt = 0 or
∂lt/∂τt = 0 when ηt is chosen optimally. Intuitively, the equilibrium choice of ηt “absorbs”
all political cost-benefit considerations that relate to the distortion of labor supply, and
the choice of τt therefore reflects the same considerations as in the model without elastic
labor supply.
In conclusion, whether taxes to fund public services are raised at the regional or federal
level depends on the strength of the general equilibrium effects on capital accumulation,
Ft, and the deadweight losses of taxation perceived by regional governments, X lst .
B Proposition 2
Proposition 2. In the general model:
(i) The federal government always levies taxes.
(ii) Let Ωt ≡ (ω/νt + 1) and Λt+1 ≡ (εRk + εwk(1 + λ)γ̄t+1) = −Ft(1− τt − τ̄t)/β. If
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t +
β
1 + β
Λt+1
(∑
j
θjt
1 + β + δγjtΩt
)−1
≥
σ
(
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t + λγ̄t
∑
j
θjt (1 + β + δγ
j
tΩt)
γjt
)
, (16)
then all regions levy taxes as well and grants generically equal zero.
(iii) If the opposite condition holds, then grants are strictly positive and fully crowd
out taxes in regions with a low valuation of public services.
(iv) A mean preserving spread of the γjt ’s reduces the set of parameters for which
condition (16) holds, rendering grants more likely.
Proof. (i) The marginal benefit of federal taxes includes the term
∑J
j=1 θ
j
t
(
ω
νt
+ 1
)
γjt (1−δ)
τt−xt .
Since δ ∈ (0, 1), taxes cannot be zero since otherwise this term would diverge.
(ii) Suppose that all regional tax rates are interior such that
τ jt =
(1− τt)δγjtΩt − (1 + β)σxt
1 + β + δγjtΩt
.
This implies (1−τt−τ̄t) = (1+β)(1−τt+σxt)
∑
j θ
j
t/(1+β+δγ
j
tΩt) and
∑
j θ
j
t/(1−τt−τ
j
t ) =
(1 + β + δγ̄tΩt)/[(1 + β)(1− τt + σxt)].
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With an interior federal tax rate the corresponding first-order condition holds with
equality. Substituting the expressions above into this first-order condition yields
Ωt(1− δ)(1 + λ)γ̄t
τt − xt
=
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t +
β
1+β
Λt+1
(∑
j
θjt
1+β+δγjt Ωt
)−1
1− τt + σxt
.
Similarly, substituting the expressions above into the equilibrium condition for grants
yields
σ
Ωt
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t + λγ̄t
∑
j
θjt (1+β+δγ
j
t Ωt)
γjt
1− τt + σxt
≤ (1 + λ)(1− δ)γ̄t
τt − xt
.
Combining the last two relations, we conclude that interior tax rates at the federal level
and in all regions constitute an equilibrium if the following parametric inequality condition
is satisfied:
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t +
β
1 + β
Λt+1
(∑
j
θjt
1 + β + δγjtΩt
)−1
≥
σ
(
1 + β + δΩtγ̄t + λγ̄t
∑
j
θjt (1 + β + δγ
j
tΩt)
γjt
)
.
In the non-generic case when the condition holds with equality positive tax rates constitute
an equilibrium and grants are indeterminate. If the condition holds strictly then the
marginal benefit of grants is negative; positive tax rates constitute an equilibrium as well
in this case and grants equal zero.
(iii) If the parametric condition does not hold it must be the case that at least in
one region the tax rate is zero. A similar reasoning as in (i) then implies that grants are
positive, since otherwise the marginal benefit of regional taxation in that region would
diverge. Since the marginal benefit of regional taxation is increasing in the preference for
the public service, γjt , grants crowd out taxes in the regions with the lowest valuation.
(iv) A mean preserving spread of the preference parameters reduces the left hand
side of (16) (see also above inequality) since it increases the geometric average of 1/γjt .
Similarly, it increases the right hand side of (16). A mean preserving spread therefore
reduces the set of parameters for which (16) holds, rendering grants more likely.
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